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Brian MacPherson’s summary and framing of my position give me an opportunity to 
clarify it. 
 First, I do not accept a division of arguments into deductive and non-
deductive arguments. Rather, inferences in arguments of all stripes are to be 
appraised by whether their conclusion follows from the given reasons, either 
necessarily or with some sort of modal qualifier like ‘probably’ or ‘presumably’ or 
‘possibly’.  
 Second, I would not identify the material consequence relation as I define it 
with one in which the implicatum follows deductively from the implicanta. Material 
consequence as I define it is broader than deductive consequence as ordinarily 
understood: a conclusion follows deductively if and only if it follows in virtue of the 
meaning of the premises, but it can follow materially in virtue of laws of nature or 
contingent facts about the world.  
 Third, my account of material consequence is an existential generalization: 
there must be at least one covering generalization of the argument with neither 
actual nor hypothetical counter-examples. In general, there is more than one 
covering generalization of any argument, typically many more than one–depending 
on which components of the associated conditional one generalizes over and on the 
range of each variable. So it is not a question of whether the covering generalization 
of an argument lacks counter-examples but of whether a covering generalization of 
the argument lacks them.  
 Fourth, I do not conceive of instances of a generalization as substitution 
instances. Substitutional conceptions of consequence involve substituting a 
grammatically parallel content expression for a given content expression. My 
conception of consequence uses schemata. I have not clarified how instances of 
schemata are to be constructed, but I would not like to restrict them to the 
resources of a given language. If there are actual or hypothetical states of affairs that 
would make the existential quantification of the antecedent of a covering 
generalization true, then there is an instance of the covering generalization to be 
considered. If the language lacks the resources to express this instance, then the 
language should be enriched so that it has the needed expressive resources. 
 With those clarifications, I am happy to agree with MacPherson that there are 
many good arguments where the conclusion is not a consequence of the premises, 
either formally or materially. However, I believe that my account of material 
consequence can be extended to cover such arguments, by allowing inference-
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licensing covering generalizations to hold for the most part or ceteris paribus or 
even sometimes. For example, the conclusion of a good argument to the best 
explanation is made plausible by its premises in virtue of the generalization that 
explanations of data that meet the criteria for argument to the best explanation are 
generally correct. 
 MacPherson raises a number of difficulties with applying structural 
equations modelling (SEM) semantics to determine whether a counter-factual 
singular conditional is true. With respect to the hypothetical situation where 
Vladimir Putin lives in the White House, he notes that there are other causal 
pathways than the one on which I focus, including the pathway in which Putin takes 
over the United States after a major war. This point seems perfectly correct. Perhaps 
it is problematic in both possible-worlds semantics and SEM semantics to determine 
whether Putin would live in Washington if he lived in the White House. And perhaps 
the reason for the determination being so problematic lies in the unclarity of the 
question. Intuitively, I for one am baffled about what to say if I were asked: If 
Vladimir Putin lived in the White House, would he live in Washington, D.C.? I would 
want more clarification: How are you supposing that the current President of Russia 
would have come to live in the official residence of the President of the United 
States? It seems that one can only give a determinate answer to the question with 
any confidence if one knows the causal mechanisms by which Putin is supposed to 
have come to live in the White House. If so, that is a vindication of SEM semantics, 
since it is just the sort of information that SEM semantics needs for the evaluation of 
counter-factual singular conditionals. 
 MacPherson raises as a difficulty for SEM semantics that it does not 
straightforwardly apply to counter-factual conditionals in mathematics. Perhaps, 
however, one can extend causal modelling to the modelling of non-causal 
determination relations. I used the example of the counter-factual situation in which 
a figure was a circle with non-zero radius and simultaneously a square with sides of 
non-zero length. The situation is mathematically impossible, but intuitively one can 
see that, if there were such a figure, it would necessarily have a non-zero area, but 
would not necessarily have an area greater than nine square centimetres. Within an 
extended SEM semantics, one might model the relation between the radius of a 
circle and its area, as well as the relation between the length of the sides of a square 
and its area, in terms of determination relations, which in each case would go in 
each direction. So the graph would be cyclic (i.e. non-recursive). 
 
